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Central Bankers often follow a policy of "constructive ambiguity", which means
that the bailout policy is not announced ex-ante (Goodhart and Schoenmaker [1995],
Santomero and Hoﬀman [1998], Bennett [2001] provide empirical evidence). This is
mostly justiﬁed by the objective of avoiding excessive risk-taking by banks (see a re-
view by Enoch et al. [1997]) or by social beneﬁts (see Freixas [2000] for a costs-beneﬁts
analysis). Researchers address the issue of constructive ambiguity in assuming that
banks may be bailed out with some probability, which is known to the public. In gen-
eral, however, there is no reason to assume that this piece of information is available to
the agents. Cukierman and Meltzer [1986] present one of the ﬁrst models to encompass
political ambiguity, in which they assume that the public forms rational expectations
about the policy indicators on the basis of the historical path of signals. What hap-
pens if such path of signals is absent or if agents do not trust the information from
the past? The issue becomes more relevant in an environment, where the public is
heterogenous, and the outcome crucially depends on what beliefs each group of agents
has. The current paper addresses the issue of ambiguous policy from the point of view
of allocative eﬃciency of the resulting market equilibrium. The purpose of the current
paper is twofold. First, it suggests a novel explanation for disintermediation, which
can arise as an equilibrium outcome if the public is not informed about the regulatory
policy. Second, it introduces decision-making under ambiguity in a market-equilibrium
framework. Constructive ambiguity with regards to bank failures resolutions is a nice
example of a political ambiguity in a heterogenous framework; similar results may be
2obtained in other equilibrium situations with political ambiguity.
The issue of expectations (beliefs) formation under ambiguity has been paid a
great attention in the literature. Uncertainty is often modeled in the von Neumann-
Morgenstern [1944] Expected Utility (EU) framework. Ambiguity may be viewed as a
special case of uncertainty, when the probabilities of events are unknown to the decision-
makers.1 One of the approaches to deal with ambiguity, which received an increasing
attention of economists, is Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) approach suggested by
Schmeidler [1989]. Recently, Chateuaneuf et al. [2007] introduced a special CEU
representation, which counts for both pessimism and optimism. An optimistic agent
counts for the best outcome, whereas a pessimistic agent counts for the worst one.
This aspect of the decision-making under ambiguity will play an important role in the
current paper.
Generally, it is not a trivial task to formally introduce ambiguity in an equilibrium
framework. Eichberger and Kelsey [2000] and Marinacci [2000] introduce ambiguity in
the concept of a game equilibrium. Eichberger et al. [2007] suggest various social in-
teraction games, in which ambiguity either distorts equilibria (e.g. it aﬀe c t sp r i c e si n
Cournot competition) or selects equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilib-
ria. However, it is unclear, what is the source of ambiguity in such games, especially if
they only have equilibria in pure strategies. In Eichberger and Kelsey [2000], it is rather
a behavioral phenomenon, with players building beliefs with regards to their rivals’
strategic behavior. In Marinacci [2000], games are assumed to be context-dependent
and players face ambiguity with regards to which game is actually played. In contrast
to these and similar studies, the ambiguity in the current paper naturally arises from
1 Sometimes ambiguity is called Knightian (1921) uncertainty. See Ellsberg (1961) for discussion
of the literature on risk and uncertainty.
3the fact that one of the agents (Regulator) selects the subgame, which other market
participants (bankers and depositors) play. Even if bankers and depositors are rational
and informed about the objectives of the regulator, they cannot reveal, which action
will the regulator choose, if the latter does not commit to any of them, because of the
multiplicity of the regulator’s optima. For the time of writing, the author is unaware
of other attempts to study decision-making by heterogenous agents under ambiguity
in the context of a standard market equilibrium, as opposed to games.2
The focus of the current paper is an economy with agents (depositors) wishing
to invest their ﬁxed endowment into a risky asset, which dominates the risk-free one.
However, they have no access to the market of the risky asset, which justiﬁes the
existence of banks in the economy. Banks are assumed to be completely ﬁnanced
through [uninsured] deposits. Banks act as the second group of decision-makers in
the economy, whose investment decision is explicitly modelled. Finally, there exists
a regulator, which can either liquidate or bail out banks in case of their insolvency.
The objective of the regulation is to provide depositors with the same investment
opportunities, which would be available for them if the market access would not be
restrained. Explicit modelling of the decision-making by banks and depositors allows
one to study the market equilibrium.
An important diﬀerence of the model here from other studies of constructive
ambiguity in banking regulation is the treatment of the ambiguity. When the bailout
policy is not announced ex-ante, agents work in an environment, where the probability
distribution over possible outcomes is not known. For example, in the models of Freixas
[2000] and Shim [2006], the only "public" are bankers who are supposed to know the
2 Of course, market equilibrium can also be modeled in game-theoretic terms. Then the model might be seen
as the one providing an alternative introduction of ambiguity in a standard Nash-equilibrium framework.
4probability of bailouts. Even if they are not informed about the actual policy of the
regulator, they have an identical subjective probability distribution about it and thus
form homogenous expectations (beliefs) about the policy outcomes as does the public
in Cukierman and Meltzer [1986]. Introducing depositors into the model makes the
public heterogenous, which implies that beliefs may diﬀer among agents. Akerlof [1970]
was the ﬁrst to indicate that an asymmetry in information may lead to suboptimal
market outcomes. In contrast, both bankers and depositors in the current paper have
identical information and are equally rational in their decisions. The model takes into
consideration the asymmetry in beliefs of bankers and depositors regarding the bailout
policy of the regulator. If such an asymmetry is present, the equilibrium outcome may
result in disintermediation. To improve the situation, the Regulator may still freely
choose the probability of bailouts, but should signal it to the public in order to align
the public’s beliefs.
The paper begins with a simple game-theoretical example in Section 2, which
illustrates the idea of the equilibrium distortion through ambiguity. Section 3 intro-
duces the economic environment. In a risky environment, it is possible that banks are
insolvent, therefore insolvency resolution is discussed in Section 4. Market equilibrium
and optimal regulatory policy are identiﬁed in Section 5. Section 6 studies beliefs of
agents and market equilibrium under ambiguity. The paper concludes with a summary
of results.
2A n e x a m p l e
Before proceeding with a formal description of the model, it might be useful
to consider a simple game, which gives intuition for the principal idea of the paper.
5Experiments show that players not always land at Nash-Equilibria. Goeree and Holt
[2001] give the following example: in a two-players coordination game, players obtain
the payoﬀ of 90 if they both choose action L, or they obtain the payoﬀ of 180 if both
choose action H,a n dt h ep a y o ﬀ of zero if one of them plays H whereas the other one
plays L. Besides, there exists an outside option for one of the players, who obtains 40 if
he does not enter the game, in which case the payoﬀ of the other player is x. Obviously,
the outside option is dominated by a mix of H and L, hence only strategy combinations
LL and HH are Nash equilibria. In experiments, 80 percent of outcomes coordinated on
the high-payoﬀ equilibrium. However, if x is large enough (x =4 0 0in the experimental
treatment), only 32 percent of outcomes coordinated on this equilibrium, 16 percent
coordinated on the low-outcome equilibrium, and more than half of all the cases were
uncoordinated, non-Nash outcomes. Goeree and Holt [2001] explain this by a reasoning
that when x is high, the player with the outside option expects his rival to choose L
and therefore avoids choosing H himself. This expectation is of a behavioral nature
and only limitedly rational: a rational player should obviously expect that the rival
understands that the outside option is dominated and will never be played.
Now, consider a game with three players: R, B,a n dD. First, player R decides,
which subgame players B and D should play. Then, players B (rows) and D (columns)
play one of the following subgames:




t 0,2( 0) 0,4 (1)
b −2,2( 1) −2,4( 1)
B
g d
t 0,2( 0) 0,1( 1)
b 1,2( 1) 1,3 (1)
T h en u m b e ri nb r a c k e t si st h ep a y o ﬀ of player R, it does not depend on his
6strategic choice. The game possesses two Nash equilibria in pure strategies: (1,t,d)
and (2,b,d). In a sequential game, when player R makes his action known to players B
and D, both equilibria are subgame perfect, and one would expect players landing at
one of the two equilibria, depending on the choice of R. Should we also expect players
landing at one of the two Nash equilibria in a simultaneous game, or when players B
and D are not informed about the action of player R?
Like in the example of Goeree and Holt [2001] above, players might build expec-
tations about their counterpart’s choice. Assume that players B and D try to guess,
which subgame they will be actually playing. There is an important diﬀerence between
them: pairwise comparison of the payoﬀso fp l a y e rB in each strategy combination in
both subgames shows that player B is better oﬀ, if subgame 2 is played; the same
exercise for player D s h o w st h a th ei sb e t t e ro ﬀ, if subgame 1 is played. If both players
are pessimistic and count for the worst payoﬀ structure, then player B would act as
though he were playing subgame 1. Player D,i nh i st u r n ,w o u l da c ta st h o u g hh e





t 0,2 (0) 0,1( 1)
b −2,2( 1) −2,3( 1)
The unique Nash equilibrium in this perceived subgame is (t,g), which is distinct
from the equilibria in the original game. Formally, the payoﬀsi nt h el a s tm a t r i xa r e
the perceived payoﬀs ,b u ta ss o o na sw eo b t a i n(t,g) being the equilibrium combination
of strategies, we can ﬁnd actual payoﬀs in the original game for the one or the other
7action of player R. Incidentally, perceived payoﬀs in equilibrium are the same as in the
original game. Player R would play either 1 or 2, or a mix of them, since his payoﬀ is
equal in both cases. However in this case his payoﬀ is lower than before, when players
B and D were informed about the action of player R. It turns out that it does matter
for the outcome of the game, whether players B and D are informed about the strategic
choice of player R.
Let player R b ear e g u l a t i n gb o d y ,a n dp l a y e r sB and D be market agents, say
bankers and depositors, like in the model below. The above game may be treated in the
following way. Subgames 1 and 2 are types of the regulatory policy conducted by the
regulator, e.g. commitment to bailing out banks in ﬁnancial distress, or to liquidating
them. If insolvent banks are liquidated (Subgame 2), bankers enjoy limited liability, and
reap positive expected proﬁt if invest risky (action b), or zero expected proﬁti fi n v e s t
safe (action t). Depositors then either get a high payoﬀ if deposited (action d)w i t ht h e
bank investing risky, or enjoy a lower payoﬀ otherwise. If insolvent banks are bailed
out (Subgame 1), bankers are penalized for insolvency and their payoﬀ is negative,
if they invest risky. Depositors, however, enjoy higher payoﬀs due to guarantees on
deposits. If depositors and bankers know the policy of the regulator, the resulting
equilibria deliver regulator the payoﬀ of 1. If they are not informed about the policy of
the regulator, the game can end with a (t,g)-equilibrium, which is strictly worse for all
the players. Note that the regulator cannot improve the situation through his policy
choice.
The model below views the interactions between bankers and depositors from
a market perspective. Though it focuses at the deposit market, similar results may
be obtained for other cases of regulatory ambiguity or political intransparency. Such
8examples may be market-entry decisions in a monopolized industry, which depend on
the antimonopolist policy of the regulator; R&D or launch of new products conditional
on the governmental support/subsidization; macroeconomic performance conditional
on the monetary policy, etc.
3 The Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of risk-neutral agents distributed at [0;1],
and two types of ﬁnancial assets, one risky3 and one risk-free. The model describes
two periods: in the ﬁrst period, decisions and investments are made, and in the second
period, a state of nature s ∈ {H,L} is realized and investment gains reaped. Each
household is endowed with one unit of wealth in the beginning of the ﬁrst period.
3.1 Markets
The markets of both risky and risk-free assets are characterized by an absolutely elastic
supply of assets. The risky asset yields a gross rate of return of rs in state of nature s,
the risk-free asset yields rF in each state of nature. The probability of state s = H is







H +( 1− p)r
L >r
F (A-2)
Short sales are not allowed, hence the amount invested in ﬁnancial assets is non-
negative. Assumptions A-1 and A-2 guarantee that a ﬁnancial portfolio of a risk-neutral
agent would only contain the risky asset. Since the supply of the asset is perfectly elas-
tic, market equilibrium would result in the allocation of funds entirely in the risky
3 It may be convenient to think of the risky asset as of an investment project like a production



















Figure 1. Sequence of events
asset. This is a reference point for the analysis.
3.2 Banks
Assume, transaction costs prevent agents from entering the market for the risky asset.
They still have an access to the market of the risk-free asset. Transaction costs justify
the existence of banks, which oﬀer a deposit contract with a duration of one period
and without a premature withdrawal option. The banking sector is assumed to be of
a unit size, perfectly competitive and homogenous. Banks belong to a small part of
agents, who manage banks and are called bankers.4
The sequence of interactions between banks and depositors is shown in Fig. 1.
In the ﬁrst period, three actions take place: ﬁrst, banks are created, then deposits are
collected and, ﬁnally, banks invest. In the beginning of the second period, the state
of nature is realized. Other three actions take place in the second period: ﬁrst, banks
reap portfolio gains, then deposits are repaid, and the banks are closed. The economy
terminates at the end of the second period.
There exists also a regulatory authority (Regulator), which chooses in the ﬁrst
4 Throughout this paper, banks and bankers are synonyms. Bankers are inﬁnitesimal in the population.
10period to either liquidate or bail out insolvent banks. The term "liquidation" is used
to describe the insolvency resolution, as opposed to the duly closure of each bank at
the end of the second period, when the economy terminates.
4 Insolvency Resolution
In the ﬁrst period, banks collect deposits in the amount of D and invest them in
a portfolio with share x of the risky asset and share (1 − x) of the risk-free one. In the





s +( 1− x)r
F¤
D (1)
The bank is insolvent if V s <r DD. If the insolvent bank is liquidated, each
depositor receives V s
D per unit of the initial deposit and thus faces the state-contingent
rate of return xrs+(1− x)rF. Bankers enjoy limited liability and obtain the payoﬀ of
zero: max
¡
xrs +( 1− x)rF − rD;0
¢
D =0i ft h eb a n ki si n s o l v e n t .



















and depositors are repaid in full.5 Bankers are assumed to internalize the costs of
bailout proportionally to the size of the liquidity injection with coeﬃcient θ ∈ [0;1].




















If θ =1 , we obtain complete internalization of costs by bankers, which corre-
sponds to "unlimited liability".6 If θ =0 ,t h ep a y o ﬀ of bankers is the same as in the
5 For the sake of brevity, the source of such a subsidy is not discussed here. It may be thought as taxes
collected by the Regulator from future generations, which are not considered in the two-period setting here.
6 To avoid possible negative consumption in the second period, we might assume that agents obtain in the
second period a lump-sum payment additionally to the investment payoﬀ. In this case the penalty of
11liquidation case, and as a result, bankers’s choice does not depend on the regulatory
policy. The introduction of the costs internalization makes bankers’ choice dependent
on the choice of the regulator. It is a metaphor for other distortions in the decision-
making by bankers, which may be caused by the regulatory policy.
Hoggarth et al. [2003] stress that government liquidity injections are mostly
conditional on changes in senior management, who lose their jobs; at the same time,
shareholders bear some losses as well. Although management’s losing jobs is not rel-
evant for the one-period setting in this paper, the losses of shareholders still play an
important role. Speciﬁcally, in order to prevent moral hazard, government can mandate
an infusion of private sector capital, when performing an open bank assistance. This
idea is captured by the internalization of costs above. Although there is no moral haz-
ard in the model, costs internalization prevents negative eﬀects of the limited liability
(which is then a special case with θ =0 ). Brown and Dinç [2005] provide an empirical
evidence on costs internalization for bank failures in emerging markets. They report,
in particular, that if a failed bank is taken over by the state, prefailure owners and top
management lose the most; depositors tend to lose much less, if anything. Bailouts
in the current paper do not capture takeovers, but reﬂect the same idea of penalizing
bankers for the bad outcome.
5 Optimal Bailouts
In this section, we derive the optimal bailout policy of the regulator. The objective
of the regulator is to replicate the allocation of funds, which would be achieved, if
depositors had access to the market of the risky asset. Recall from Section 3 that
bankers (internalized bailout costs) is deducted from this amount. This additional payment does not change the
decision-making in the ﬁrst period, this is why it is superﬂuous for the analysis and not considered in the text.
12risky asset dominates the safe one in terms of expected gains, and hence households
would invest their entire endowment in the risky asset. Therefore, the Regulator should
choose the probability of bailout to ensure in the deposit market equilibrium that (1)
agents deposit their entire endowment with banks, and (2) banks portfolios consist
entirely of the risky asset.
In period 1, the Regulator announces bailout probability z. Depositors are aware
of p, z and x, therefore they can build expectations about future deposit repayments,
given the deposit rate rD.
5.1 Households
Households decide upon the composition of their portfolio with share a of deposits and
(1−a) of the safe asset and search for max



















In (4), the ﬁrst term corresponds to the deposit payoﬀ in the bailout case: a units
of deposit are repaid in full with interest rate rD no matter whether the bank is solvent
or not. The second and the third terms correspond to state-contingent deposit payoﬀs
in the liquidation case: if the bank is insolvent, depositors only obtain xrs+(1− x)rF
pro unit of deposit in each state of nature s. The fourth term describes the payoﬀ
through investment in the safe asset, which depends neither on the state of the nature
nor on the liquidation/bailout decision of the Regulator.
Since there is a unit mass continuum of households possessing a unit endowment, a







Solving for a∗ is straightforward due to the linearity of Ge in a: depositors place
their entire endowment as deposits with banks, as soon as the expected return from
depositing is higher than the risk-free rate of interest. If the expected deposit payoﬀ
equals to the risk-free return, households are assumed to invest in the deposit contract.
This assumption simpliﬁes the exposition. A possible interpretation of it could be
inﬁnitesimal transaction costs, induced by a purchase of the risk-free asset. This leads
to the following proposition:

















rF − rL¢ (6)
Note that the demand for deposits depends on the deposit interest rate rD and on





represents the interest margin, which depositors require in order
to switch from risk-free assets to deposits. It is distinct from the risk premium. It is
easy to check that the risk premium in this case is zero since agents are risk-neutral.
5.2 Banks
In period 1, each bank decides upon its portfolio composition x and the amount of
deposits D to be collected. The banks are aware of two possible actions of the Reg-
ulator: bailout with probability z, and liquidation with probability 1 − z.T h e s t a t e
contingent payoﬀ of banks is conditioned on the state of nature s and on the action
of the Regulator and discussed in Section 4. Banks’ payoﬀ in state of nature s is
max
£
xrs +( 1− x)rF − rD;0
¤
D. In addition, if the Regulator plays "bailout", banks









































The ﬁrst two terms correspond to the expected proﬁt of banks under limited
liability. The third and fourth terms stand for the costs internalization. Note that
with no internalization, the probability of bailout would vanish from the expected
payoﬀ of banks.
Each bank seeks for max
x,D
Πe subject to D ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.T h e s o l u t i o n o f
this optimization problem is again straightforward due to its linearity in both D and
x. It is important to distinguish between the cases z =0and z>0.I fz =0 ,b a n k
is liquidated with certainty and enjoys limited liability. Its objective function is then
zero if rD >r H, which implies indiﬀerence with regards to D and x.T h es a m ea p p l i e s
to the case θ =0 .
Proposition 2 If the Regulator bails out insolvent banks with probability z ∈ (0,1],








[0;1] if rD > 1
p+zθ(1−p)
¡
prH + zθ(1 − p)rL¢
{1} if rD ≤ 1
p+zθ(1−p)
¡






{0} if rD > 1
p+zθ(1−p)
¡
prH + zθ(1 − p)rL¢
[0,∞) if rD = 1
p+zθ(1−p)
¡
prH + zθ(1 − p)rL¢
{∞} if rD < 1
p+zθ(1−p)
¡
prH + zθ(1 − p)rL¢






[0,∞) if rD ≥ rH
{∞} if rD <r H
Note that in a banking sector of a unit size, Dd from Proposition 2 describes the
aggregate demand for deposits.
5.3 Equilibrium and Optimal Bailout Rule
We need now to deﬁne the deposit market equilibrium and compare the resulting
allocation with the reference point for diﬀerent bailout policies. If we denote with
X∗ equilibrium aggregate investment in the risky asset, and with D∗ - equilibrium
aggregate amount of deposits, then the optimal policy of the regulator is the one, for
which X∗ = D∗ =1 .
Deﬁnition 1 For a given bailout policy z, competitive equilibrium is the allocation of
funds (X∗,D ∗) and the interest rate rD
c , which provides














= a∗ ∈ argmaxGe







The deﬁnition of equilibrium requires that deposit supply equals deposit demand.
Note that equilibrium is parametrized on the bailout policy of the regulator. The
portfolio choice x∗ by banks is uniquely determined by the equilibrium interest rate rD
c
and the regulator’s choice of z.G i v e n x∗ and D∗, the equilibrium investment in the
risky asset is determined by X∗ = x∗D∗.
Proposition 3 If the Regulator bails out insolvent banks with probability z ∈ (0,1],








p + zθ(1 − p)
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pr
H + zθ(1 − p)r
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The proposition straightforwardly follows from propositions 1 and 2. Fig. 2
illustrates the proposition. In the ﬁgure, rD










prH + zθ(1 − p)rL¢
are the critical rates of interest for both depositors’ sup-
ply of and bankers’ demand for funds. It is easy to check that rD
D <r D
B.7
Multiple equilibria in the commitment to liquidation case are characterized by
excessive interest rates (higher than the best possible risky outcome), but all of them
provide investment of the entire households’ endowment into the risky asset. This
allocation is eﬃcient since it replicates the one, which would result from the households’
optimization problem if they had direct access to the market of the risky asset.
This result ensures that the objective of the regulator is achieved with any policy
z ∈ [0;1]. However, it was assumed throughout the discussion that both depositors
and bankers are informed about the policy of the Regulator, even if it is a stochastic
bailout-liquidation rule 0 <z<1. The next section explores, what happens in the
economy if the policy choice of the regulator is unknown to the agents and they have
to make decisions under ambiguity.
7 First, note that
∂rD
B




B (θ =1 ) . Multiplying both sides
with p + z (1 − p) yields
(p + z (1 − p))r







H + z (1 − p)r
L
which is equivalent to
r
F − (1 − p)(1− z)r
L <p r
H + z (1 − p)r
L








strictly increases in x
(except for certainty p =1or regulatory commitment to bailouts z =1 ), it never exceeds r
D
D.
Since the latter is always smaller than r
D


























 z = 0   z > 0 
Figure 2. Equilibrium with known bailout policy (z>0) and commitment to liquida-
tion (z =0 ).
6 Ambiguous Bailouts
Assume the Regulator does not commit to any bailout rule. Uncertainty about
regulatory policy induces uncertainty about the payoﬀ structure in the model. Note
that the analysis above does include uncertainty in form of a possible mixed strategy
of the regulator, i.e. a stochastic bailout-liquidation rule. Now it is assumed that
depositors and bankers possess less information than before, but still are symmetrically
informed about the economy. To be precise, depositors and bankers are informed about
the following: (1) the set of players in the economy, (2) set of strategies of each player,
and (3) payoﬀ functions of all players. Payoﬀ functions are stochastic and determined
by the realization of the random variable s, which determines the state of nature, and
consequently, the realization of the return of the risky asset.8 As we have seen above,
uncertainty in terms of stochasticity does not destroy eﬃciency of the equilibrium
allocation. Ambiguity is an uncertainty, which is distinct from stochasticity.
6.1 Nature of Ambiguity and Decision-making
Under assumption of rationality, agents should be able to predict, which policy the reg-
ulator chooses, if they know the payoﬀ function of the latter. Since it was assumed that
8 One might wish to see nature as a fourth player in the game. This would require additional discussion, which
is not in the focus of the current paper.
18the objective of the regulator is to provide for eﬃciency of the equilibrium allocation,
both depositors and bankers can identify that this objective may be achieved through
any policy in the range z ∈ [0;1]. However, which probability should they count for,
when solving their respective optimization problems? There is no reason, why both
depositors and bankers should count for the same probability of bailouts. Clearly, de-
positors and bankers operate under uncertainty, which is represented by a continuum
of probability distributions over the regulatory policy. This kind of uncertainty is a
special case of ambiguity.
One of the relevant concepts for decisions under ambiguity is the notion of pes-
simism and optimism. Wakker [2001] deﬁnes optimism and pessimism on the basis of
choices, which agents would make, if their actions lead to diﬀerent outcomes in diﬀerent
states of the world, probabilities of which are unknown. For example, if households in
the current paper have access to the market of the risky asset, but are not aware of the
probability distribution p, they would also face ambiguity. Knowing that two states of
nature are possible, they might prefer to invest in the risky asset (which corresponds
to optimism) or to invest in the risk-free asset (which corresponds to pessimism). The
reason for that is that for an optimist, the best possible outcome overweights the worst
one, and for a pessimist the opposite is true.9 There are several ways to capture opti-
mism and pessimism in the decision-making.10 To show that an equilibrium outcome
under ambiguity may diﬀer from the one under a stochastic bailout rule, we assume
that agents weight best and worst. If we denote the degree of pessimism with α,t h e n
9 Gneezy et al. (2006) provide a paradoxical experimental evidence that a lottery over the
best and the worst may be valued signiﬁcantly lower than the worst outcome itself. Decisions
under ambiguity, as described in the text, are not related to such behavioral eﬀects.
10 Chateauneuf et al. (2007) introduce non-extreme outcome additive capacities (neo-additive
capacities) to represent the CEU as a weighted sum of the EU-term, a pessimistic term, and
an optimistic term. Simple capacities (see, e.g. Eichberger and Kelsey, 2000) also capture the same possibility.








with Ge (z) denoting the expected gains of depositors (4) for a given bailout policy z.
The ﬁrst term in (8) corresponds to pessimism and counts for the worst outcome, and
the second term corresponds to optimism and counts for the best outcome. Extreme
pessimism corresponds to α =1 . The ambiguity itself is captured by the fact that
bailouts may follow any probability distribution z ∈ [0;1]. More generally, z ∈ ∆z ⊆
[0;1] with ∆z capturing the degree to which agents are informed about the regulatory
policy. If ∆z = {b z} then (8) turns into Ge (b z), and we obtain the above discussed case
without ambiguity.
Diﬀerentiating (4) with respect to z yields ∂Ge
∂z =0if rD >x r H +( 1− x)rF,o r
∂Ge
∂z > 0 in all other cases. Therefore, the worst expected outcome for depositors is
associated with liquidation of banks: min
z∈[0;1]
Ge (z)=Ge (0). The best expected outcome
takes place if the regulator bails out insolvent banks: max
z∈[0;1]
Ge (z)=Ge (1).T h i si m p l i e s





























Note that technically, (9) repeats (4) if we replace z := 1 − α.
We can do the same exercise for banks, by replacing Ge (z) in functional (8)
with expected payoﬀ of bankers Πe (z) from (7). To keep generality, we assume that
the degree of pessimism of bankers is given by β, which is not necessarily equal to


























For positive values of D we obtain ∂Πe
∂z < 0 for all rD,e x c e p tf o rt h ec a s e
xrL +( 1− x)rF >r D,i nw h i c h∂Πe
∂z =0 . Therefore, the worst expected outcome
for bankers is associated with bailouts: min
z∈[0;1]
Πe (z)=Πe (1). The best expected out-
come is associated with liquidation: max
z∈[0;1]
Πe (z)=Πe (0). T h i si st h er e s u l to ft h e
internalization of bailout costs by bankers. Similarly to depositors, bankers maximize










































Note that similarity between (9) and (4) as well as between (10) and (7) is only
technical and does not arise through substitution of some perceived probability of
bailouts instead of z. T h i sw o u l db et h ec a s ei fw ec o n s i d e ra s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o n
leading to diﬀerent degenerated priors ∆z = {b z} for depositors and bankers. Instead,
the information is symmetric, and both face the same prior ∆z = [0;1] for the bailout
policy. Even more, depositors and bankers treat the missing information in the same
way, and as a special case we can obtain equal degrees of pessimism α = β.I ti st h e
degree of pessimism that technically replaces z in objective functions.
216.2 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
As noticed above, technically the objective function of depositors (9) under ambiguous
bailout policy repeats their objective function (4) with z =1− α. Their optimization
problem is the same as before. To determine the supply of deposits, it suﬃces to

















rF − rL¢ (11)
The same applies to banks. Their objective function corresponds to (7) with





[0;1] if rD > 1
p+βθ(1−p)
¡
prH + βθ(1 − p)rL¢
{1} if rD ≤ 1
p+βθ(1−p)
¡






{0} if rD > 1
p+βθ(1−p)
¡
prH + βθ(1 − p)rL¢
[0,∞) if rD = 1
p+βθ(1−p)
¡
prH + βθ(1 − p)rL¢
{∞} if rD < 1
p+βθ(1−p)
¡
prH + βθ(1 − p)rL¢
We can deﬁne an equilibrium in a similar way as before:
Deﬁnition 2 For given degrees of pessimism α and β, the equilibrium under ambigu-
ity with regards to the bailout policy is the allocation of funds (X∗,D ∗) and the interest
rate rD
a , which provide






















maximizes β · min
z∈[0;1]
Πe (z)+( 1− β) · max
z∈[0;1]
Πe (z)
and a∗ maximizes α · min
z∈[0;1]
Ge (z)+( 1− α) · max
z∈[0;1]
Ge (z).
Note that the equilibrium is not anymore parametrized on the bailout policy,
since it is not announced. Instead, the equilibrium is parametrized on the degree of
pessimism of the agents. The following proposition establishes that under extreme
22pessimism of agents, the economy may settle in an ineﬃcient equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Let α be the degree of pessimism of depositors and bankers. If bankers

























with r = 1
p+βθ(1−p)
¡
prH + βθ(1 − p)rL¢









rH−rL characterizes the investment climate in the
economy: it relates risk, pessimism and rates of return. With extreme optimism of
both depositors and bankers (α = β =0 ) ,t h el e f ts i d eo fi tt u r n st ou n i t ya n dt h e
condition is true for any rates of return rH >r F >r L. In this case, regulatory
ambiguity has no eﬀect on the market equilibrium. With extreme pessimism (α =
β =1 ) and complete internalization of bailout costs by bankers (θ =1 ), the condition
turns to p2 ≥ rF−rL
rH−rL, which stresses that in economies with high investment risk (low
p) and relatively low risk-free rate rF, ambiguity in bailout policy would result in a
disintermediation: X∗ = D∗ =0 . If the risky asset represents productive ﬁrms, the
intermediated economy would fail to link creditors (depositors) and borrowers (ﬁrms),
although the market economy would provide for such a link under the same parameters
p, rH, rL and rF.
To highlight the intuition behind the proposition, we assume α = β = θ =1 .
Competitive banks choose x∗ =1and set the deposit rate so that their expected proﬁt
is zero. If D>0, this implies deposit interest rate of prH +( 1− p)rL,w h i c hs h o u l d





, required by depositors. This is only
possible if p2 ≥ rF−rL
rH−rL.I nf a c t ,i n e ﬃcient equilibria appear because pessimistic banks
23 
















Figure 3. Equilibrium under ambiguity: extreme pessimism, α =1 , and high invest-
ment risk, p2 < rF−rL
rH−rL.
exhibit cautionary behavior and avoid acquiring deposits at high interest rates. At
the same time, pessimistic depositors exhibit cautionary behavior as well, and avoid




















































































Figure 4. Degrees of pessimism, costs internalization and ineﬃcient equilibria
Figure 4 provides an illustration of the result for arbitrary degrees of pessimism
and costs internalization. Condition p ·
p+(1−α)(1−p)
p+βθ(1−p) ≥ rF−rL
rH−rL corresponds to the area





rF−rL, which intersects the axes in points




rF−rL > 1 and 1
1−p
rH−rF
rH−rL > 1 (both are above unity due to Assumption A-2). For
some given degree of costs internalization θ, the dotted area in the picture represents
ineﬃcient equilibria. In order for disintermediation to arise in equilibrium, neither do
depositors and bankers need to be extremely pessimistic (α = β =1 ), nor do they
need to have equal ambiguity attitude (α = β)a ta l l .T h ea r e aa b o v et h el i n eβ = α
represents higher pessimism of bankers, whereas the area below the line corresponds
to depositors being more pessimistic than bankers. If p2 ≥ rF−rL
rH−rL, the threshold line
lies above the area [0;1]
2,t h u sm a k i n gi n e ﬃcient equilibria impossible for any values
of parameters α, β and θ. This explains why the issue of disintermediation due to the
ambiguity in banking regulation can be less (if anything) relevant for economies with
low aggregate investment risk (high p).
If p2 < rF−rL




rF−rL represents the highest degree of
costs internalization, which still allows to avoid disintermediation for any ambiguity
attitudes of the public: the penalty for bankers is not high enough to prevent them
from operating under a deposit interest rate, which would be satisfactory for depositors,
even if both exhibit extreme pessimism (α = β =1 ). Note that the internalization
of costs by bankers is in this case conditional on the investment climate: with high
investment risk (low p) it might be optimal for the regulator to encourage banking
activity through setting low θ.12 However, this is unnecessary if the regulator informs
the public about the bailout policy.
Recall that objective functions of depositors (9) and bankers (10) under ambiguity
technically coincide with their objective functions (4) and (7) under announced bailouts
if z =1−α for depositors and z = βθ for bankers. If the bailout policy z is announced
12 θ should still be positive to avoid negative eﬀects of limited liability.
25to the public, beliefs of depositors and bankers align along the line βθ =1−α in Figure
4, which lies entirely in the area of eﬃcient equilibria, no matter how (un)favorable
the investment climate is and what degree of costs internalization is imposed by the
insolvency regulation.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Regulatory ambiguity and intransparency have been for a long time being in the
center of economic debates. The common approach to the issue is representing intrans-
parent regulatory policy with a probability distribution over its possible realizations.
This approach fails to capture possible heterogeneity of beliefs of uninformed agents.
If the policy of the regulator is not announced, the public estimates the likelihood of
the future outcomes according to their degrees of pessimism or optimism. Even if the
public are homogenous in their ambiguity attitude, they can form diﬀerent beliefs, if
the regulation has an asymmetric impact on them.
In the current paper, regulatory ambiguity is studied in the market equilibrium
framework. It is shown that even if agents are perfectly rational and symmetrically
informed about each other, as well as about the macroeconomic environment, some
missing piece of information can play a crucial role in determining the equilibrium
outcome. The fact that the regulator is better informed about his policy than the
public, does not create a problem of asymmetric information, since the regulator does
not participate in the market interactions. If the perfectly rational public are informed
about the objective function of the regulator, they may wish to ﬁnd the optimal reg-
ulatory policy, which they would count for in their decision-making. However, if there
are multiple optima, the public have to make decisions under ambiguity.
26Regulatory ambiguity is studied here in application to the deposit market. An
ambiguous bailout policy creates an asymmetry in beliefs of depositors and bankers
with regards to the action of the regulator in case of banks’ insolvency. This may
result in a suboptimal allocation of funds as compared with the market outcome. In-
forming agents about the probability of bailouts eliminates the asymmetry in beliefs
and restores the optimal allocation of funds. This result provides a reason for limiting
the "constructive ambiguity" to a stochastic bailout rule with a probability of bailouts
known to both bankers and depositors.
The ineﬃciency result seems to be more likely for economies with high aggregate
investment risk and high internalization of bailout costs by banks (penalty on bankers).
If the regulator cannot credibly signal about his policy, and as a result the beliefs of
the public cannot align, eﬃcient equilibria still can be ensured, if the internalization
of bailout costs by banks is low. This suggests an additional aspect of a penalty based
regulation.
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